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Deep Theorizing in International Relations 
 







This paper starts from the observation that, at a time when the popularity of grand theory is in 
decline among IR scholars, they do not agree on what they mean by theory. In fact, the 
celebration of theoretical pluralism is accompanied by the relative absence of a serious 
conversation about what ‘theory’ is, could, or should be. Taking the view that we need such a 
conversation, this puts forward the notion of ‘deep theorizing’. Countering both the shallow 
theorizing of modern scholarship that conflates theory with scientific method, and the 
postmodern view that abstract narratives must be deconstructed and rejected, it offers a 
reading of the parameters along which substantial theorizing proceeds. Specifically, it 
suggests that ‘deep theorizing’ is the conceptual effort of explaining (inter)action by 
developing a reading of drives/basic motivations and the ontology of its carrier through an 
account of the human condition, that is, a particular account of how the subject (the political 
actor) is positioned in social space and time. The paper illustrates the plausibility of this meta-







This article explores practices of theorizing world politics to put forward a reading of what is 
called ‘deep theorizing’. It starts from two observations. The first is that scholars of 
International Relations (IR) do not agree on what they mean by ‘theory’. More than three 
decades after James Rosenau noted that “much of the writing [in the field] suffers from loose 
and ambiguous conceptions of theory” (Rosenau 1980), the editors of EJIR stated “there 
remains no agreement on what constitutes proper theory in IR” (Dunne et al. 2013: 14; also 
Burchill, 2001: 8). Instead, we are presented with different kinds and types of theories 
attesting pluralism not only in the sense of having an ever-growing number of theories but in 
the very meaning of theory (Zalewski 1996; Jorgensen 2010; Dunne et al. 2013). The second 
observation is that the proliferation of ‘theories’ goes hand in hand with the perceived decline 
of established ‘isms’. If there is a consensus among IR scholars it seems to be dismissing 
‘grand theory’ as suitable frameworks for generating meaningful insights and conversations 
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about world politics.1 Approaches like realism and liberalism, in particular, are seen as reified 
dinosaurs from a bygone era whose insights are at best inadequate and at worst dangerous. 
They are said to be unscientific and ideological, promote insular thinking and stand in the 
way to progress (Lake 2011). Instead, we are urged to trace ‘processes’ and ‘mechanisms’ at 
the micro-level, and to critically dismantle all paradigms and engage with the vernacular.  
 
Breaking with paradigms and developing new ways of understanding world politics is 
important and keeps the field alive. But is a theory what you make of it? Are there features 
that make some theories – the process of theorizing – more substantial than others? Most 
scholars would probably answer ‘no’ and ‘yes’, but won’t go further. When John Vasquez 
(1995) noted over twenty years ago that not everything that calls itself such is a theory, he 
echoed a familiar complaint voiced by the likes of Stanley Hoffmann (1959), Raymond Aron 
(1967), or Kenneth Waltz (1979) who in their days saw ‘theory’ as an over-used and abused 
term among IR scholars. This observation still holds. The celebration of theoretical pluralism 
is accompanied by the relative absence of a serious conversation about what ‘theory’ is, 
could, or should be. Of course, there are exceptions (Chernoff 2007; Waever 2009; Burchill 
and Linklater 2009; Dunne et al 2013; Weber 2015; Jahn 2016). But for the most part, IR 
scholars seem to be happy with typologies and vague definitions of theory that do not offend 
anyone.  
 
The problem with letting many theoretical flowers bloom is that it can crowd out substance. 
More precisely, it risks leaving the playing field to powerful voices whose narrow 
understanding of and attitude towards theory reduce appreciation of and appetite for 
substantial theorizing. While I disagree with the view that the field of IR is witnessing a 
retreat from theory (Dunne et al. 2013; see Berenskoetter 2012), I think Guzzini (2013) is 
correct in noting that theorizing world politics is squeezed between the emphasis on ‘practical 
knowledge’ and the popularity of what Mearsheimer and Walt (2013) call ‘simplistic 
hypothesis testing’. Adding to the squeeze are postmodern and historical approaches that meet 
in the view that abstract thinking is doing more harm than good. The result is an academic 
field in which ‘theory’ is used loosely, narrowly and dismissively at the same time, which 
reduces it to a technical tool in the service of policy and pays little attention to, or is unsure 
how to deal with, bold new attempts to theorize world politics (e.g., Booth 2007; Deudney 
2007; Lebow 2008; Weber 2016). It also underestimates the power of grand theory. I do not 
think this state of affairs is to be welcomed. But how to counter the squeeze, that is, how to 
                     
1 Tellingly, grand theory is not discussed in the most recent stock taking volume (Booth and Erskine, 
2016).  
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regain an appreciation for substantial theorizing? Rather than denouncing grand theories, 
what do they capture and how to create alternatives?  
 
This article tackles the issue on a meta-theoretical level. If theory is an overused term, we 
need to take a step back and try to develop a “clearer notion of what the theoretical enterprise 
entails” (Rosenau 1980: 21). Or, at least, we need to have a conversation about what makes 
for a substantive theory and, thus about the fundamental parameters along which theorizing 
proceeds. Offering a step in this direction, the article counters both the shallow theorizing of 
modern scholarship that conflates theory with scientific method, as well as the postmodern 
stance that abstraction and foundational claims must be rejected. Instead, it puts forward a 
reading of what accounts for theoretical depth. In a nutshell, it holds that deep theorizing is 
about developing a picture of political (inter)action and order through conceptions of drives 
(primary motivations) and the ontology of its carrier (the political actor), which are grounded 
in an account of the human condition - namely, an account of how the subject is positioned in 
social space and time. The article suggests that grand theories offer such a picture. Hence, the 
basic argument is that thinking ‘grand’ requires going ‘deep’.  
 
The attempt to carve out foundational parameters of theorizing world politics might appear 
presumptuous and seen as an unnecessary and problematic move to discipline thought. Such 
is neither the intention nor, hopefully, the character of this article. While deep theorizing, as 
understood here, endorses a sort of post-foundational foundationalism, the aim is not to come 
up with a blueprint for ‘how to do theory’, let alone to define orthodoxy. It recognizes that 
there is no Archimedian point from which to explain a complex and often contradictory world 
and that all theories offer positioned knowledge and, hence, are limited in scope and carry 
within them a particular bias. The effort here is to take seriously the reading of theories as 
‘perspectives’, but also shares the ambition to carve out a space for dialogue between 
different paradigms based on the contention that they offer “different perspectives on the 
same…ontological issue” (Wight 1996: 294). Whereas some see this space created around a 
core concept like ‘practices’ and its empirical manifestations (Adler and Pouliot 2011: 11), or 
in the acceptance of an unobservable reality that can be grasped theoretically across subject-
positions (Wight 1996, 2016), this article takes a different approach: it highlights how 
theories embed particular conceptions of agents, their drives and (inter)actions in subjective 
readings of the human condition, that is, in particular answers to the general question of what 
is, or should be, our place in social space and time. It thus supports the call for closer attention 
to the human and its reflexive capacities in our theoretical constructs (Jacobi and Freyberg-
Inan 2015) and demonstrates that doing so allows us to reground, recast and reconceptualize 
grand theories as situated, political and dynamic.  
 
This is the accepted version of a forthcoming article that will be published by Sage in European Journal of 
International Relations: http://journals.sagepub.com/loi/ejta  
Accepted version downloaded from SOAS Research Online:  
 4 
The discussion proceeds in four steps. The first part establishes three elements of political 
theory, the interpretive, explanatory and the normative. The second part reviews the barriers 
both modern and postmodern stances have erected against the pursuit of substantive 
theorizing. The third part sketches my reading of deep theorizing as conceptually tying an 
account of primary motivations to the ontology of the actors and grounded in an 
understanding of its spatial and temporal situatedness. The fourth part illustrates the 
framework in a discussion of realist, liberal and postcolonial schools of thought.  
 
Re-Approaching Theory 
A sensible starting point for thinking about theory is to ask about its purpose, what we need it 
for. In basic terms, theories are abstract mental frameworks – Gedankenbilder, as Max Weber 
put it – assisting us with generating knowledge about the world and offering a general 
language across empirical areas of expertise. In doing so it shapes academic debates and the 
contours of the field. Yet our specific conception of, and attitude towards, theory is informed 
by what kind of knowledge we think we can and should obtain, i.e. what we consider useful, 
or valuable knowledge. So how theory is understood and used in an academic field is also a 
result of the power structures that shape the field’s conception of useful knowledge. With that 
in mind, loosely following George Sabine (1969 [1931]), it is safe to say that all political 
theories – including grand theories of world politics – combine three elements: an 
interpretive, an explanatory, and a normative. Each of these alludes to a particular function of 
theory and is tied up with views of what is possible and useful knowledge.2 
 
The interpretive (or heuristic) element enables us to see who and what is out there, what is 
happening, and to make sense of experiences and connect them to a meaningful picture of 
‘the world’. In the words of Hans Morgenthau (2011 [1954]: 266), theory enables us “to bring 
order and meaning to a mass of phenomena which without it would remain disconnected and 
unintelligible” (also Waltz 1979: 4ff). By giving us categories and concepts and by placing 
them in a relationship, theory works as a source of meaning and cognitive guidance. It makes 
the world intelligible by mitigating its complexity (there is too much ‘stuff’ to be grasped at 
once) and its ambiguity (the ‘stuff’ needs to be interpreted). It provides an ontology, which 
makes us see actors, structures, events, dynamics, and problems (Cox 1981), and it guides our 
formulation of important questions (Hoffman 1959: 348). Thus we often call theory a 
‘framework’. While some are satisfied with the heuristic function and relegate the discovery 
of causes to empirical research (Humphreys 2011), most scholars expect theory to provide not 
                     
2 While a theory may highlight one element and downplay another, the suggestion that those elements 
describe different kinds of theory (Jorgensen 2010; also Dunne et al. 2013) is misleading, as it gives the 
impression that theories can have only one of those functions. 
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just concepts but to connect them into explanations and arguments, “statements of what may 
roughly be called a causal nature” (Sabine, 1969 [1931]: 12). In other words, theory has an 
explanatory function; it helps us understand how and why things happen. As Hume argued, 
experience cannot establish causes, we can only experience or observe conjunctions of A and 
B occurring together. Establishing why they occur together and how exactly A and B are 
related is a mental process, making cause “a human invention” (Lebow 2014: 1). In line with 
work encouraging IR scholars to broaden our conception of causation (Kurki 2008; Lebow 
2014), the explanatory function is understood here as an abstract argument of why the certain 
(inter)action, events, dynamics, etc in our picture occur. As such, following Weber’s (1992: 
107f) point that Verstehen is a form of explaining, it also encompasses ‘constitutive’ 
theorizing (Wendt 1998; Lebow 2014).  
 
Whereas the first two elements primarily serve an analytical purpose, the normative element 
highlights how theory guides thoughts and actions with the intent of improving our lives. It 
expresses the theorist’s value-orientation and reveals that heuristic and explanatory functions 
are infused with subjective experiences, concerns and hopes. Catering to the human ambition 
to shape the future and make that world a better place, theorists raise questions and offer ideas 
with the hope to influence the course of events relevant to the socio-political context they care 
about. Theorists are not always transparent about this aspect, indeed they often hide their 
normative outlook as it stands in tension with the ambition to produce objective and 
‘scientific’ scholarship. However, as a recent comprehensive attempt to bring the normative 
element back into the sight of the mainstream reminds “every international relations theory is 
simultaneously about what the world is like and about what it ought to be like” (Reus-Smit 
and Snidal 2008: 6; see also Smith, 2004; Levine 2012).  
 
Containing all three elements, grand theories are “singing our world into existence” (Smith 
2004) by providing ‘big pictures’ of a configuration of particular actors, their interactions 
with each other and within a particular socio-political order that governs their lives. They 
show how these interactions (should) lead to the emergence, maintenance and challenge of 
international order, which involves the exercise of power in both coercive and productive 
forms and, thus, politics. Importantly, in their analytical and normative function, grand 
theories are not sterile models divorced from concrete political concerns and struggles.3 Like 
all political theories, they are created in and mobilized to make sense of a particular socio-
political context; often “secreted…in the interstices of political and social crisis” (Sabine 
                     
3 This appears to have been the reading of C. Wright Mills, who is credited with coining the term 
‘grand theory’ in his critique of functionalism (Brown 2013). 
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1969 [1931]: 3). Formed out of ‘practical knowledge’ and with the ambition to feed back into 
it (Morgenthau 2011 [1954]; Guzzini 2013; Mearsheimer and Walt 2013), they shape the 
worldviews of practitioners and are “politically relevant” (Jahn 2016: 9). Judgments about a 
theory’s relevance depends on whether the world it depicts resonates with us. Yet, as Chris 
Brown (2013: 2) points out, “to qualify as ‘Grand’, a theory should…have implications 
beyond the immediate discourse within which it was created”. Offering a picture that is global 
in scope and universal in appeal is arguably a desirable quality for theories seeking to capture 
world politics. And so, in their ambition to think big, grand theories (must) claim that their 
insights stretch beyond a particular geographical and historical context and touch on broader, 
more general ‘truths’ about the worlds built, experienced and imagined by humans.  
 
The tension between seeing a theory embedded in a particular sociopolitical environment and 
expecting it to offer insights and arguments that transcend this context is well known. My 
way of negotiating this tension is to suggest that for a theory of world politics to qualify as 
‘grand’ it also needs to be ‘deep’ by grounding its big picture of actors, (inter)actions and 
orders in answers to fundamental philosophical questions of where and who we are, or want 
to be, in social space and time. The answers are particular and depend on the theorists’ 
position, which turns the pictures of world politics into perspectives. As such, the 
perspectives offered by grand theories might be incompatible, but the answers underpinning 
them are formulated along the same philosophical parameters, which provide the ‘macro-
foundations’ of grand theories.4 Such a reading still allows a claim to universality, but it is a 
particular kind that “rejects the false and politically inspired dichotomy between universalism 
and relativism” (Acharya 2014: 649). Before engaging this, and to justify the effort, let us 
briefly review why both modern and postmodern stances – broadly speaking the two sides of 
the ‘third debate’ identified by Lapid (1989) – have come to distract or discourage IR scholars 
from thinking about theory in ‘grand’ terms and, thereby, also from deep theorizing.  
 
The Modern Move to Shallow Theory 
The assumption that humans have the ability to make world intelligible with the help of 
cognitively stable abstractions that assign domains and limits to ‘things’, that we can 
demarcate, order and accumulate causal knowledge about ‘the world’, and thereby learn to 
control and improve it – all that has a distinctly modern undertone. Even if theorists are aware 
that their ontological maps and explanations are more ideal types than mirror images of 
‘reality’, the modern ambition/belief is that these can serve to accumulate ever more accurate 
knowledge about ‘the world’ in two ways. The rationalist approach emphasizes the human 
                     
4 As opposed to the micro-foundations of ‘middle range’ theory (Lake 2013). 
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ability to reason and make logical, systematic and coherent connections in the mind (creating 
what is also termed ‘pure theory’). Slightly different, the empiricist approach emphasizes the 
senses and holds that insights/arguments are abstracted from experience (creating ‘empirical 
theory’). Thus, coherent and consistent logical reasoning makes the theory internally valid, 
whereas evidence that ‘fits’ establishes its external validity.  
 
The modern ambition to progressively de-mystify the world regards theory as a scientific tool 
that needs to be continuously sharpened to improve our ontological map and explanations. 
This is done by ‘applying’ theories, a process in which the modern approach merges with 
positivism and pragmatically combines two strategies: testing the theory against ‘reality’ and 
against ‘rival’ theories. Through such testing, the strengths and weaknesses (‘flaws’) of a 
theory are revealed, and if it turns out to be weak one can either attempt to ‘fix’ the theory or 
discard it. The modern logic for evaluating the quality of a theory is thus quite simple: 
theories are either good (right/valid) or bad (wrong/invalid) depending on whether it can be 
supported by evidence – or ‘verified’ – and fares better than alternative ‘rival’ theories. This 
means theoretical knowledge is always relative; a theory is never good in and of itself but can 
only be better than others, which implies that the quality of a theory is generated and 
sustained through competition. Consequently, theories need to be designed in a way that 
allows such evaluation to take place. The focus on testing theory through empirical 
verification is complemented by Popper’s emphasis on the need to produce propositions that 
can be ‘falsified’ by stating clearly what evidence would be needed to ‘disprove’ the 
proposition.5 This principle, combined with a commitment to parsimony, has been very 
popular among IR scholars and discouraged theorizing in a deeper sense by effectively 
reducing the meaning of theory to a simple causal statement, or hypothesis, of the kind ‘if A 
then B’. Thus, in their treatise on research design King, Keohane and Verba could afford to 
hardly discuss theory. And when they mention it, theory is understood as an “interrelated set 
of causal hypotheses” (King et al., 1994: 99) with falsification as its most important 
‘property’, culminating in the claim that “a ‘theory’ which cannot be wrong is not a theory” 
(King et al., 1994: 100). By declaring a logically falsifiable statement an “essential criteria” of 
theory (Vasquez 1995: 230) this stance has to either dismiss or ignore grand theories, which 
cannot be reduced to falsifiable hypotheses.6  
 
                     
5 Popper knew that theories cannot be falsified in the strict sense as no conclusive disproof can ever be 
produced empirically, but considered the principle a necessary critical check (Popper, 1968). 
6 Although some still feel compelled to pay lip service to falsifiability (Wendt 1999: 373). Also, this 
does not prevent attempts to derive hypotheses from grand theories. 
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As such, the modern stance happily operates with a shallow understanding of theory.7 Not 
only does it reduce concepts to variables and arguments to narrow causal statements, it fares 
poorly with regard to all three aforementioned elements of theory: it does not integrate the 
interpretive function into the task of theorizing but settles its ontology on the level of 
assumptions; it reduces the explanatory element to a simple ‘If A then B’ hypothesis; and it 
ignores the normative element of theorizing in the name of scientific credibility and the quest 
for objective truths. Moreover, the view that a theory is good only if it can be tested against 
rival theories and supported empirically shifts attention to method. Indeed, it invites scholars 
to conflate theory and method by confusing the task of identifying meaningful relationships 
through a philosophically grounded framework with the procedure of ever-more precise data 
collection. By cherishing research designs that place persuasive weight on clear hypotheses 
and the process of gathering empirical evidence, the scientific ambition created an academic 
environment where scholars supposedly talk about ‘theory’ but mean method (King et al. 
1994; Shapiro et al. 2004). And more than three decades after Rosenau (1980) noted that the 
field of IR suffers from confusion between theory and method, this problem is more prevalent 
than ever (Mearsheimer and Walt 2013).  
 
 
The Postmodern Resistance to (Grand) Theory 
IR scholarship inspired by the ‘post-modern’ Zeitgeist and infused with a critical stance, often 
under the label of ‘post-structuralism’, marks the other end of the spectrum.8 As the ‘post’ 
indicates, its views on the purpose and possibility of knowledge go ‘beyond’ the modern 
position. It sees modern thought in crisis, as relying on categories unable to make sense of the 
world we find ourselves in, and critical about the project of modernity more generally (Brown 
1994). In contrast to the modern ambition to reduce complexity, ambiguity and contradiction, 
a postmodern stance embraces these features. Rather than seeking coherence and logical unity 
of thought, it emphasises the incoherence and fragmentation of knowledge; and so rather than 
asking theorists to generalize, connect and order the world into a harmonious whole it asks 
them to accept that the world is particular, disjointed and disorderly (Der Derian and Shapiro 
1989; Rosenau 1992). This postmodern position rests on a reading of the subject and its 
capacities as complex and lacking unity, as “unsettled” (Edkins 1999; Lyotard 1984: 15), and 
as embedded in multiple social relationships that are “more complex and mobile than ever 
before” (Ibid; see also Luhmann 1992). Because there is no unifying subject that can assign 
                     
7 See also Smith (1996). I adopt the terms ‘shallow’ and ‘deep’ theory from Nicholson (1996: 136).  
8 Labeling all ‘poststructuralist’ scholarship ‘postmodern’ is problematic, yet the merger is common 
enough in the IR literature. For calls to differentiate between the two, see Campbell (2007: 211) and 
Brown (1994: 2). 
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coherence to the world and because of the world’s every increasing complexity – because the 
knowing subject and the object of knowledge both ‘disappear’ – we cannot possibly gain that 
cognitive stability and guidance modern theorists strive for.  
 
This view about impossibility of solid epistemological foundations has significant 
implications for the approach to theory. It harbours a suspicion of the interpretive and 
explanatory function and rejects how they are practiced in modern theorizing, not least due to 
the latter’s downplaying, if not denial, of the normative and subjective element. In IR, this 
merges with a critical stance of trying to expose, expand and escape from the crisis of the 
modern project. That is, the post-modern stance on knowledge is (uneasily) combined with 
critical theory’s emphasis on emancipation: rather than seeking control of nature, the primary 
purpose of knowledge is (to enable) emancipation by “identifying and eradicating 
unnecessary social confinements and constraints” (Linklater 1996: 281). Theories are seen as 
such constraints: abstract reifications that blend out and ‘forget’ their positioned and 
subjective nature (Cox 1981). The issue is not merely cognitive bias. Theories are criticised as 
meta-narratives that impose particular worldviews and advance political projects hidden 
behind a claim to nature and reason; as ideologies based on myths attempting to turn cultural 
particularities into universal truths (Weber 2010: 6f; see also Walker 1989, Levine 2012). 
Consequently, the task is to demystify theories as neutral instruments of scientific research, to 
deconstruct their reified ontology and simple explanatory logics and expose them as socio-
political constructs. This not only involves critical engagement with causal claims, concepts 
and categories, but also with the language, style and format in which theory appears, that is, 
the aesthetic of theoretical representation (Bleiker 2009).  
 
Given its anti-foundationalism and emancipatory stance we might say, with Paul Du Man 
(1982), that the post-modern position inhabits a Resistance to Theory expressed in two ways. 
First, it involves digging up and deconstructing foundational claims. Drawing on heuristic 
frameworks developed by Foucault, Derrida and other postmodern icons in continental 
philosophy, this scholarship can be very skilful in scrutinizing theories and problematising 
their assumptions, concepts and logic through a method of deconstruction and immanent 
critique (Zehfuss 2002; Burke 2008; Arfi 2012). Yet while sharpening our eye for the socio-
political parameters of a theory and tracing its foundational claims, the postmodern approach 
asks also us not to accept these foundations and the theoretical house built on it. Thus, the call 
for liberation from modern orthodoxy goes hand in hand with, second, the call to resist and 
reject abstract representation of the world for analytical purposes in order to keep an open 
mind. Its proponents are convinced of the impossibility of grand theory (Behnke 2001) and 
ask us to “forget IR Theory” (Bleiker 1997). Rather than creating or buying into abstract 
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representations, it seeks to show what is left out and brushed over in modern designs by 
retrieving silences and embracing aporia through historical genealogies and by tracing 
subaltern realities through ethnography and more playful methods such as poetry (Bleiker 
1997; 2009) or collage (Sylvester 2009). In short, it seeks out a contingent, complex and 
incoherent reality unvarnished by theory.  
 
These two intellectual positions – the first dominant in the United States and the second more 
prominent in Europe – offer very different approaches to theorizing. They ground their 
respective conception of and attitude towards theory in a particular reading of the nature of 
the human subject and its abilities, intertwined with a particular reading on the kind of 
knowledge humans can or should produce. This leads the modern scholar to employ a shallow 
conception of theory, whereas for the post-modern scholar it requires the rejection of (grand) 
theory. Both end up with methods. What is left behind is a constructive engagement with and 
appreciation for efforts to substantially theorize world politics. The following is an attempt to 
recover this position. 
 
Recovering Deep Theorizing: Thinking Through the Subject and its Drives 
The use of the term ‘theorizing’ indicates that theory is treated here not as a static map or 
model but as a thought process. Although this is often hidden when the result is presented in 
writing, few theorists would claim to have created or to be working with a complete and 
motionless framework. A theory is always an incomplete train of thought and, hence, it makes 
more sense to speak of theorizing as an open-ended process: a rich, dynamic and creative 
undertaking of weaving conceptual webs that are open and malleable rather than fixed and 
firm, with arguments developed rather than simply stated. Experience, positionality and logic 
play an important role in this process, which is never free of tensions, giving room to 
criticism and disagreement and allowing ‘the theory’ to adapt and evolve.  
 
With that in mind, grand theories of world politics are understood here as amalgams of 
theories of action and of order. They depict a particular world of actors whose (inter)actions 
make possible the emergence, maintenance and challenge of (international) order. In this 
picture, the ontology of actors and their drives and, through them, conceptions of agency are 
of central importance. While IR theories are often sees as foregrounding structures and 
systems, it is drives turn the subject into an actor “capable (at least in principle) of critically 
evaluating and reconstructing the conditions of their own lives” (Emirbayer and Mische 1998: 
964) and, thus, of initiating and engaging in (inter)action. There is no agency without that 
“internal spring to action (Boucher 1998: 13). For a long time the question “what moves man” 
(Freyberg-Inan 2004) was answered with reference to the concept of ‘interest’ as the preferred 
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heuristic shortcut (Hirschman 1986; Kratochwil 1982). Some have offered theoretically 
sophisticated explorations of how ‘interests’ are formed and/or have sorted through different 
kinds and types of motivational forces, like needs, desires, intentions or preferences (Wolfers 
1962; Kratochwil 1982, Finnemore 1996; Frieden 1999; Lebow 2008). It is much more 
common however to treat the concept in simple and uncomplicated ways. After dutifully 
acknowledging that humans harbor a multitude of ‘interests’, theories tend to single out one 
or two which are presented as assumptions or subtly woven into the theory. The same goes for 
the ontology of the political subject/actor embodying these drives. Yet as interventions by 
feminist scholars and participants in the structure/agency debate have long shown, IR theories 
constitute their actors, complemented more recently by work exploring links between drives 
and actor ontology on a cognitive, psychological, neurological and emotional level (Wendt 
1999, 2003; Freyberg-Inan 2004; Lebow 2008; Epstein 2013; Hutchison and Bleiker 2014). 
The impression that theorists pick pre-formed actors with innate drives from the world stage, 
upheld by declaring them part of the theory’s unalterable “hard core” (Lakatos 1970), may be 
convenient for stylizing a theory into a stable model. But it only conceals the thought process 
bringing them to life. 
 
The approach here thus sees drives and the ontology of actor(s) as constructed together and 
suggests that carving out their form(s) and relationship(s) is an integral part of deep 
theorizing. My entry point for thinking more carefully about this process is Steve Smith’s call 
that scholars should pay more attention to “the viewpoint of the actors” (Smith 2004: 511). 
On the back of his observation that most IR theories deduct motivations and behavior of 
agents from a structural logic,9 Smith asks theorists to tell stories about action and order 
through the eyes of the subject(s), which necessarily includes acknowledging that theory is 
written “with a view from somewhere” (Smith 2004: 514). Taking the ‘inside’ perspective, he 
suggests, provides a better understanding of the kind of structures that matter to actors, and it 
improves our conceptualization of agents and the motivation(s) behind their action. 
Reminiscent of calls for standpoint theory made in feminist scholarship (Harding 1993), 
Smith effectively directs attention to an epistemological perspectivism in theorizing that 
thinks ontology and drives with, or through, the subject. In line with recent calls to take a 
careful look at the human element in theorizing the international (Jacobi and Freyberg Inan 
2015), this is the approach probed here. Given that actors in world politics usually – but not 
necessarily – take the form of human collectives, theorizing through the subject raises the 
issue of anthropomorphism. Reading ‘the subject’ as a collective Gestalt can be justified by 
noting that cognitive, linguistic, moral, and affective capacities of humans are intertwined 
                     
9 This is already visible in Wendt (1987). See also Doty (1997). Even in Wight’s (2006) sophisticated 
conceptualization, agents are largely made up of structures.   
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with and find expression on the social level. At the same time, IR theorists may well be guilty 
of anthropomorphism. That is, we may have to accept that the theorist’s own positionality and 
experience not only influences how they depict actors and but also tempts them to treat 
collective actors as if they are ‘persons’.  
 
Rediscovering the Human Condition: Situatedness in Space and Time  
What, then, are the parameters along which deep theorizing proceeds? The basic claim here is 
that actor ontology/ies and their drives/basic motivations, which spur (inter)action along a 
spectrum from conflict to cooperation, are developed through an account of the human 
condition. This is different from anchoring ontologies and drives in human nature. The latter 
designates a quasi-essentialist understanding of properties and drives shared by all humans; it 
purports to know what and who the actors ‘naturally’ are and what they want, and in doing so 
provides analysts with a universal baseline for explaining behavior regardless of context.10 As 
such, references to human nature allow theorists to fix ontology and ‘interests’ qua 
assumption. By contrast, a human condition approach is concerned with delineating the 
environment that self-conscious/reflexive humans find themselves in and with exploring how 
their engagement with this environment influences behavior (Harvey, 1989). To be sure, 
accounts of the human condition are not entirely free of understandings of human nature. For 
instance, the biological fact that the human body is made up largely of water is linked to the 
need to consume water, and so humans need to live with access to water. Yet as our biological 
system also needs oxygen we cannot survive in water without the assistance of machines, so 
we usually find humans living on land, making earth “the very quintessence of the human 
condition” (Arendt 1958: 2). And to ask how humans perceive their environment requires 
senses that perceive and a mind that processes those perceptions. Indeed, the clearest sign of a 
‘human nature’ element in the approach presented here is the Kantian view that, as conscious 
and reflexive beings, humans try to make sense of their environment and of themselves within 
it. It accepts the need for orientation – to make sense of, and ones’ situatedness in, ‘the world’ 
– and, thus, accepts the “impossibility of perspectiveless thinking” (in Hutchings 2011: xx). 
The line between assumptions about human nature and accounts of the human condition is 
thus blurry. And yet, the distinction is important because their respective implications for and 
demands of theorizing are quite different (Arendt 1958: 9f.).  
 
On its own, the need for orientation does not tell us anything about the form of the actor or its 
possible actions. For that we need an account of the human condition that shows the ontology 
                     
10 On human nature assumptions in IR theory, see Doyle (1997); Freyberg Inan (2004); Symposium on 
‘The Return of Human Nature in IR Theory’ in the Journal of International Relations and 
Development vol. 9, no. 3 (2006); Brown (2009); Crawford (2009); Jacobi and Freyberg Inan (2015). 
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of the subject/actor as part of a configuration in which certain drives and (inter)actions 
become possible and pertinent in the first place. Establishing a theoretical link between the 
ontology of actors, their drives and the environments they are situated also identifies a 
particular set of problems or challenges that actors face (Cox 1981). As such, importantly, an 
account of the human condition is not a discrete thing that can be theorized on its own. It is 
part of the subject/actor as much as the subject/actor is a part of ‘it’. As Arendt (1958) lays 
out in her discussion of particular conditions and human activities, we cannot meaningfully 
conceptualize the condition separate from the subject and its drives. They are existentially 
intertwined and unfold together. In Arendt’s words “men are conditioned beings because 
everything they come in contact with turns immediately into a condition of their existence” 
(Arendt 1958: 9). As such, humans not only experience and try to make sense of their 
condition and their place within it, they also have the power to shape it. In fact, Arendt 
suggests, the condition is “self-made to a considerable extent” (Arendt, 1958: 10, 9).  
 
It is common to read the human condition as having three general dimensions: the social, the 
spatial and the temporal and to see humans as existentially intertwined with all three. IR 
scholars pay automatic attention to the social dimension, as humans (groups) situated in a 
social environment (populated by other groups) gives rise to (international) politics in the first 
place. Yet the world that humans – as individuals or collectives – relate to, and within and 
towards which they act is not just social but also temporal and spatial. And, in fact, most 
theories of world politics do offer accounts of how political relations are intertwined with and 
shaped by particular conceptions of space and time – through geography, borders and bridges, 
and readings of past, present and future. When those dimensions became submerged by 
attempts of ‘naturalizing’ political space (Agnew 1994) and ‘de-temporalizing’ social 
scientific arguments (McIntosh 2015) critical scholars made them explicit again. Among 
others, Rob Walker repeatedly reminded that theories of international relations are “spatial 
framings of political life” (Walker 1995: 309; see also van Houtum et al. 2005; Branch 2014), 
and Kim Hutchings (2008) masterfully exposed the temporal orientation of IR theories (see 
also McIntosh 2015; Hom et al 2016). Before illustrating how concrete expressions of these 
dimensions are woven into grand theories, let us review how deep theorizing covers the three 
functions of theory noted at the outset.  
 
Describing the contours of social space and time in which political subjects move, and 
developing their ontology, drives and interactions through and with this environment is an 
interpretive act. As a process of constitutive theorizing, it also is explanatory. In fact, it is 
compatible with a causal account broadly understood “since, by definition, motives are 
always prior to the action and can thus be considered its antecedent conditions” (Kratochwil, 
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1989: 24f). Extending the causal story in this way is engaging in “deep causality” (Onuf, 
1989). This does not lead to holistic explanations, however. Theorizing through the subject 
requires taking seriously the Kantian insight that conceptions of space and time are not 
objective recordings of an external reality but transcendental conditions of sensible 
experience, represented through the human mind (Hutchings 2008: 3). This has implications 
for a theory’s analytical scope. Because not all humans experience, conceive of and respond 
to their socio-spatial and socio-temporal condition in the same way, different theories offer 
different accounts. Each shows a particular condition in which particular actors with 
particular drives deal with their place in space and time, which structures relationships and 
(inter)actions. In doing so, each effort at deep theorizing puts forward a unique reading of the 
nature and location of world politics.  
 
And since creating a frame that orders social space and time is a powerful way of governing 
political communities (see Berenskoetter 2014), developing a theory through such a frame is 
also political. It is expressed normatively in advancing a particular reading of the human 
condition and giving the actor a sense of what is ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ with it, expressed in ideas 
of how to maintain, improve, or challenge the condition. That is, deep theorizing not only 
asks of the theorist to “apply imagination and maintain philosophical discipline” (Rosenau 
1980: 21), it also recognizes that the theorists’ own situatedness echoes in the account. It 
accepts that “all theories have a perspective [derived] from a position in time and space” (Cox 
1981: 128) and that this position influences how time and space – and agency within it – are 
theorized. We theorize about a world we know and identify with, or against, which is 
expressed in the attitude towards the condition described, its desirability and the possibilities 
it holds for being and for action: some might see the condition as undesirable but inescapable 
and theorize about the ways political actors can adjust and make the best of it; others may 
display a positive attitude towards their portrait of the human condition and see it in perhaps 
imperfect but potentially favorable terms; and a third account may find the condition deeply 
problematic and seek ways to transform or escape it altogether.  
 
Deep Theorizing in IR: Three Examples 
Taken together, then, deep theorizing is concerned with how political actors view and 
organize their situatedness in (social) space and time, how they shape and are shaped by their 
spatio-temporal reality, and how they work with or against this condition through particular 
forms of (inter)action. This is illustrated here through three schools of thought: realism, 
liberalism and postcolonialism. Treating them as schools of thought assumes the existence of 
communities of knowledge formed by like-minded theorists and involves clustering and 
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combining their insights into a comprehensive and necessarily stylized train of thought.11 The 
three schools are chosen because they offer influential and distinct perspectives on 
international politics; they are, as Brown (2013: 493) would want it, “world-revealing”. 
Despite their alleged decline, realism and liberalism still are the heavy weights of mainstream 
theorizing in IR. Also described as forming a rationalist paradigm (Keohane 1988), they 
(partly) build on the social contract philosophies of Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau or Kant, whose 
‘state of nature’ images are among the most prominent accounts of the human condition in 
Western thought (Kersting, 1996; Doyle 1997). Yet realism and liberalism also have been 
exposed as Eurocentric, shaped by Western experiences of two World Wars, the Cold War 
and its aftermath, and as undergirded by “racist latticework” (Henderson 2013: 90).12 
Postcolonialism presents an alternative, or “antidote” (Hobson 2012) to them precisely 
because it grows out of a critique of Eurocentrism and offers perspectives from the ‘non-
West’ that are ignored by realist and liberal theorists. By reading the world from the position 
of the ‘subaltern’/the Global South, this school is able to provide “alternative accounts of 
subjecthood” (Sabaratnam 2011: 786) that focus on the experiences of and struggles against 
colonial practices.  
 
While postcolonialism thus goes some way in balancing IR’s conversations about world 
politics, using it as the third example here is not uncontroversial. Representatives of this 
approach tend to be highly critical of IR theories per se, which are seen as variations of 
European/Anglo-American worldviews and part of the imperial structure that postcolonial 
thought must resist, contest and escape from. As such, postcolonial scholars prefer to pursue 
an agenda of “situated critique” (Epstein 2014) that seeks to dismantle a system of thought 
that oppresses, marginalizes and silences subaltern experiences and voices (see also 
Sabaratnam 2011; Seth 2013). They hold that these experiences cannot be captured in abstract 
frameworks, not least because every postcolonial configuration is different and the general 
tone and universal pretense of theory are precisely what deprives the subaltern of a voice. 
While this stance has its merits, here I side with the view that a postcolonial perspective can 
be expressed theoretically and that it is possible to theorize the postcolonial subject/actor 
(Bhabha 1994; Jabri 2013; also Gandhi 1998). The tricky question remains how such 
experiences and voices can be theorized and who can legitimately do so without relying on 
“high European theory” (Young 2001: 67) and falling back into an elite Western mindset. 
Thus, my attempt to show parallels with prominent Western theories and to suggest that the 
                     
11 In Jorgensen’s typology (2010), I discuss ‘traditions’ and draw on various ‘currents’ within each. 
Kuhn’s (1996) ‘paradigm’ and Lakatos’ (1970) ‘research programme’ also designate something 
similar.   
12 On the latter point see also Vitalis (2015) 
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postcolonial condition/subject can be captured within the parameters of deep theorizing 
outlined earlier may come across as “gentrification” (Weber 2015). Still it is a worthwhile 
effort, not least because it presents postcolonialism as a substantial and important theoretical 
alternative to realism and liberalism. Whether the parameters for doing so are Eurocentric 
and, even if they are, whether that disqualifies them from contributing to an informed debate 
about postcolonial theorizing, is for the reader to judge. 
 
Realism 
Echoing Hobbes’ emphasis on the individual’s will for self-preservation, realists emphasize 
survival as the most basic drive (Herz 1959: 3). While one may be tempted reduce this to an 
instinct, the meaning of survival is logically tied to an account of what is to be 
preserved/secured. Realist ontology is one of ‘groupism’, that is, it views humanity as divided 
into distinct groups (Wohlforth 2008). This partly stems from experiencing the pervasive 
power of nationalism to form groups with distinct and exclusive territorial and historical 
claims and corresponding demands for self-determination, or sovereignty. The political entity 
set up to meet this demand is the state. Being sovereign is thus not a given but something 
people want and expect the state to be. It is an expectation the state must fulfill to justify its 
existence and, as such, a basic motivation tied to the ontology of the realist subject-actor. The 
shift from ‘the group’ to ‘the state’ as the primary actor and, correspondingly, to state survival 
as the drive, is usually brushed over in realist theorizing by treating the two as congruent. 
While this is problematic, realists shift the focus to how the state co-exists with other states 
and to develop their core features, concerns and interactions through a particular reading of 
their spatial and temporal situatedness.  
 
The demand to be(come) sovereign and the inside/outside logic this entails is expressed in 
spatial terms by reducing the state to a distinct territorial space defined through its separation 
from other states by a material border as the defining feature. In short, for realists, sovereignty 
means having control over a particular territory (Morgenthau 1960: 312; Mearsheimer 2001: 
31). The compartmentalization of the world into territorial units is upheld through mutual 
recognition of the border, which thus is a feature not just of separation but also of 
connectedness. Realists package this socio-spatial dimension of the human condition into the 
image of the state system as an anarchical environment, described by Waltz (1979: 74ff., 118) 
as a constitutive force that “molds” and “causes” states to be “alike” by encouraging 
“similarities of attributes”. Blending sociological, microeconomic and Darwinian logic and 
two corresponding mechanisms, socialization and competitive selection, states are expected to 
either adjust or disappear. Locating the constitutive force in the international system and 
portraying states as “passive-adaptive” actors (Hobson 2000) is problematic as the anarchical 
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character of the system is logically dependent on the ontology of states as sovereign/seeking 
sovereignty. Because realists are not very good in discussing this co-constitutive relationship 
between actor ontology (states) and the socio-spatial environment (anarchy), they have been 
accused of circular reasoning (Wendt 1987, 1999).  
 
Although some trace how the system “will push the range of governmental functions towards 
sovereignty” (Buzan et al., 1993: 39), realist theorizing usually absorbs the concern with 
‘sovereignty’ into ‘power’ as the dominant concept for both state ontology and basic 
motivations. The drive for power is developed through an account of the socio-temporal 
dimension, which links the will to survival to two emotional drives, namely fear and distrust. 
When realists invoke Hobbes to suggest that states in an anarchical system live in “continual 
fear and danger of violent death” (Hobbes in Doyle 1997: 114), the absence of a third party 
arbiter as such does not generate this fear. Rather, it is generated by uncertainty about what 
others might do, which strictly speaking involves two kinds of uncertainty: the impossibility 
of knowing the intentions of others and the impossibility of knowing the future. The first 
applies the problem of other minds to the collective level, as sovereign states do not easily 
share their plans and intentions with others. Intrinsic to the socio-spatial ontology of states as 
separate and ‘closed off’ entities is the difficulty for outsiders to ‘see’ and understand what 
goes on inside. The second, temporal uncertainty, is of even greater significance. A core 
aspect of realist logic is the depiction of states as temporal beings worrying about an uncertain 
future: regardless of what the interests of state Y are today, even in an environment of perfect 
information state X cannot know what Y’s interests will be tomorrow and, consequently, what 
it might do. So because the future is unknown/contingent, the intentions of other states are 
also unknown/contingent.  
 
Crucially, realists argue that states (should) respond to this condition with distrust and 
pessimism, that is, with a worst-case scenario based on the possibility that the future 
intentions of others might be hostile. As captured in Herz’s famous notion of the security 
dilemma, distrust is a rational answer to uncertainty. However the realist actor also fills the 
unknown future with historical knowledge. While there are disagreements between 
‘offensive’ and ‘defensive’ realists about what knowledge should be used to ensure a secure 
future (Taliaferro 2000), the overriding view is that war forever “lurks in the background” 
(Carr 2001 [1946]: 102). Adopting Hobbes’ view that the ‘state of nature’ is a ‘state of war’ 
because the former is a condition “wherein the will to battle is sufficiently known” (in Doyle 
1997: 114), realist actors derive their knowledge of violent conflict as a recurrent 
phenomenon from experience and History. The view of war as an ever-present possibility that 
states cannot escape gives the realist actor a pessimistic attitude and a cyclical temporal 
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outlook where “the future is the past” (Gray, 1999).13 This outlook also affects the ontology 
of interstate relations by marking them as rivals and potential enemies.  
 
This, in turn, makes it prudent to invest in measures that enable states to defend/secure their 
‘sovereignty’ in the future, thus translating the ‘will to survive’ into a ‘will to power’. Seeing 
the pursuit of power, in the sense of building up military capabilities, as driven both by fear 
and by rational calculation is a tension in realist theorizing, which also underpins the 
prescription to form alliances with states one should distrust: realist actors are expected to 
cooperate for the purpose of balancing power, yet at the same time should be reluctant to 
cooperate due to the worry about ‘relative gains’ which “affect relative capabilities in the 
future” (Grieco, 1990: 45, emphasis in original). Thus, the ‘ally’ always remains a potential 
enemy. The most decisive consequence for the ontology of the realist actor, however, is that 
the move from seeking sovereignty to maximizing power turns ‘power’ into its most 
important attribute. The sovereign state morphs into a ‘power container’. And because realists 
view power as relative, i.e. measured in comparison with the capabilities of other states, the 
ontology is comparative as well. The result is a socio-spatial image that ranks states according 
to their ‘power’ and highlights polarity, weaving a structure of hierarchy into anarchy. By 
holding that the most powerful states matter most, due to their ability to threaten others, the 
realist world is effectively reduced to a map of ‘great powers’ where small (in the sense of 
‘weak’) states are little more than moving parts in shifting alignments.  
 
Liberalism 
One of the hallmarks of liberal theorizing, going back to the idea of enlightenment, is an 
emphasis on particular human capacities and rights, and to attribute the ability to develop and 
‘own’ these capacities/rights to all individuals. As such, liberal subjects are progressive: they 
have potential for growth and the ability to reason that enables them to learn and realize their 
potential. Prominent here is the notion of the liberal subject as rational, usually understood as 
the capacity to make decisions on the basis of cost-benefit calculations and choose the option 
that maximizes their goals. Yet the ‘rational actor’ assumption by itself does not ground 
liberal theorizing. After all, realists use it as well and, strictly speaking, rationality is not a 
drive as it leaves open the goal(s) underpinning the calculation. However, distinct ontologies 
and drives become visible when the ‘rational actor’ is placed in a particular liberal account of 
the human condition. 
 
Influential strands of liberal theorizing highlight that humans seek wealth, or economic gain 
                     
13 Prominently captured in Mersheimer’s ‘back to the future’ argument (Mearsheimer, 1990) 
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(Keohane 1984). This drive is entwined with a reading of humans situated in a socio-spatial 
environment marked by interdependence and openness. In this imagery, states are depicted as 
open ‘units’, with permeable borders, and as connected, with linkages reaching into domestic 
structures (Keohane and Nye 1989; Keohane 2002). While some liberals maintain the focus 
on states, it shifts the view towards the transnational. By showing connections below, above 
and beyond states, liberal theorizing carves out international institutions and non-state actors, 
whether multi-national corporations or transnational civil society-networks, as political actors. 
For some this merely makes anarchy more complex, yet for most theorists it depicts an 
entirely different socio-spatial environment captured in John Burton’s cobweb model, or in 
the notion of globalization as a process of ‘de-territorialization’ and the emergence of a 
‘borderless world’ (Burton 1972; McGrew and Held 2007; Ferguson and Jones 2002). For 
some, globalization is “the universal condition of world politics” (Moravcsik 2008: 234), a 
dynamic and progressive space marked by openness and movement and culminating in the 
cosmopolitan ontology of humanity as one people.  
 
This space both forms and is formed by the liberal subject. A central element of liberal 
theorizing here is that actors with the freedom to move and meet (should) want to cooperate. 
As rational beings, they (should) know that diverse but compatible talents will allow for 
productive exchange and, hence, that working together is beneficial. This renders cooperation 
not simply a form of interaction but a primary motivation and manifests the liberal subject as 
a cooperative being. And as peaceful, at least towards fellow liberals: as developed in the 
‘democratic peace’ literature, actors that are free to weigh the costs and benefits of war will 
choose not to fight because they calculate that the (potential) benefits of cooperation outweigh 
the (potential) costs of fighting wars. The crucial aspect here is the once, which points to the 
necessity of having a social environment in which individuals can decide freely and are able 
to capitalize on their common/compatible interests. In other words, liberal actors are theorized 
as ‘peaceful’ if their environment allows them to be, which for IR theorists requires a liberal 
order in both political (democratic) and economic (free market) terms (Doyle 1983; Owen 
1994).  
 
The progressive theme characteristic of liberal theorizing is developed through the temporal 
dimension. As Beate Jahn (2013: 44ff.) has shown, liberal theorists historically ground the 
ostensibly natural rights of individuals in the ‘unspoiled’ life of indigenous communities to 
then argue that this ‘state of nature’, where humans are born free and equal, is lost in the 
present world and needs to be regained in the future. Due to the human capacity to learn and 
to grow, this is presented as a veritable possibility, instilling liberal actors with an optimistic 
and forward-looking attitude that sees the future as a space of opportunity. However, it also 
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depicts the world as a ‘not yet’ fully open, where some have the freedom to interact as equals 
and develop their talents but others do not. It generates an image of socio-spatial hierarchy 
where communities are separated not so much by formal borders but by gaps in the ability to 
realize their potential, essentially a two-tiered world captured in familiar metaphors of 
‘developed’ and ‘underdeveloped’, ‘modern’ and ‘pre-modern’, or ‘free’ and ‘unfree’ spaces. 
By extending the democratic peace thesis, this opens the door to a security argument that 
reads ‘unfree’ spaces, and the subjects within it, as a threat to the ‘free world’. Yet these 
threats are not permanent. Emphasizing the potential for change and maintaining that all 
humans can, want to and should be free, liberal actors contemplate how disadvantaged 
subjects can (be assisted to) transform their environment. The answer, of course, is the 
expansion of spaces of liberal economic and political order, which thus becomes a primary 
motivation and course of action (Doyle 2008; Ikenberry 1999; Jahn 2013: Ch. 4).  
 
This missionary action depicts the liberal actor as an intervening force, including through the 
use of military means, so liberal actors are not inherently peaceful. Typically, though, liberal 
agency is expressed in the establishment and maintenance of institutions, or “rule based 
orders” (Ikenberry 2001), as structures that optimize the socio-spatial and socio-temporal 
situatedness of political actors. Some see them as instruments for mitigating future 
uncertainty and foster cooperation by increasing transparency, helping avoid 
misunderstandings and monitoring compliance, making rational actors weigh their decisions 
in the ‘shadow of the future’ (Axelrod 1984; Jervis, 1999; Keohane and Martin, 1995). Others 
emphasize how institutions are used to promote liberal norms and ideas into spaces where 
they do not exist (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Risse et al. 1999; Jahn 2013), enabling subjects to 
organise their life in accordance with these norms, expecting that others will do so as well 
(Owen 1994). As such, institutions become part of the human condition by structuring 
political space and allowing subjects to act along a temporal logic of consequences, 
appropriateness, and possibility that reduces future uncertainty and enables them to become 
better and trustworthy beings. This move of stretching domestic political orders into the 
international is not without tensions, not least through its image of the liberal world as both 
free and rule-based. Yet it allows the liberal actor to wander along a spectrum from 
optimizing cooperation to freeing ‘un-free’ subjects, which accommodates both conservative 
(preservation of liberal order) and transformative (creation of liberal order) accounts of 
(inter)action. The normative element underpinning both is the combined belief in the 
universality of liberal norms and in progress, which gives liberal theorizing its distinct 
temporal outlook that favours the future. Whereas the realist subject learns from History that 
wars that cannot be escaped, the liberal subject can learn to avoid wars and turn enemies into 
friends. It ‘knows’ that it is possible to leave the past behind. In that sense, the liberal account 
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of the human condition as an interdependent and open space is, above all, a potentiality, 
which the theorist wants its actor(s) to fulfill.  
 
Postcolonialism 
Postcolonial theorizing is concerned with subjects struggling within and against a 
configuration marked by imperialism, placing the focus on the subordinated and 
disenfranchised side, the ‘subaltern’ (Spivak, 1988: 78). The conceptualization of this subject 
and its drives – seeking recognition, justice and, especially, emancipation – occurs through a 
reading of the condition of ‘postcoloniality’ (Gandhi 1998: 3). This condition encompasses 
the period of physical occupation and following it, when the population in question has 
gained formal independence yet still feels the effects of the colonial experience. The legacy of 
colonialism is thus an important aspect, which renders the meaning of the ‘post’ ambivalent.14 
In IR, then, postcolonial theorizing focuses on how legacies of former colonial relationships 
and new forms of (usually Western) imperialism and colonialism play out in contemporary 
world politics with the aim to retrieve the agency of (usually non-Western) actors.  
 
Crudely put, postcolonial theorizing develops two faces. The first shows the colonial 
relationship as a system of occupation, domination, discrimination and exploitation and 
focuses on the power the colonizer exerts over body and mind of the colonized population. 
The Gramscian frame, from which the concept of the subaltern stems, shows the latter as a 
class produced by a hegemonic system held in place by a ruling elite. This tends to be 
combined with the Hegelian master-slave metaphor and a depiction of the colonial 
configuration in two ways: (i) a unidirectional relationship where the colonizer (master) 
brings the colonized (slave) into existence and where the latter wants to be like the former, or 
(ii) a relationship in which both sides are mutually constituted and their existence intertwined. 
Both readings are expressed in different accounts of postcolonial space and time. 
 
The “architecture of the colonial space” (Jabri 2013: 26ff) is an imperial structure that is both 
transnational in scope and exercised locally, variably conceived in ‘centre-periphery’ or ‘hub-
and-spoke’ imagery (Nexon and Wright 2007). In its most tangible form, the power of the 
coloniser is expressed in the physical occupation of territory and the material organisation of 
space, including the violent coercion and oppression of native populations. There are two 
ways of reading the subaltern in this space. The first shows “a world cut in two” (Fanon 2001 
[1963]: 29), which is separately inhabited by the ‘settler’ (coloniser) and the ‘native’ 
(subaltern) and creates corresponding binary identities. The institutions of this Manichaean 
structure are created and controlled by the coloniser, limiting the movement of the subaltern 
                     
14 Omitting the hyphen, i.e. calling it postcolonial rather than post-colonial, is to indicate the overlap. 
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and restricting it to a particular space, a form of ghetto. The second reading holds that, 
precisely because the native/subaltern is an intrinsic part of the imperial structure, the 
configuration lacks a clear inside-outside distinction. The border between the space of the 
subaltern and that of the colonizer is blurred and their identities intertwined (Seth 2013; Rao 
2013), captured in the reading of the subaltern as a ‘split’ or ‘hybrid’ subject (Bhabha 1994). 
In both configurations, colonial power operates also on the mind of the subaltern. It is a form 
of psychological colonialization (Fanon) working either through Gramscian hegemony, where 
the coloniser actively manipulates the worldview of the subaltern, or through Foucauldian 
governmentality, whereby disciplining power is practiced in a more decentralised fashion 
(Nandy 1983; Jabri 2013). The epistemic violence (Spivak) this inflicts is expressed, in 
particular, in the production of a particular temporality that (re)writes the subaltern’s history 
and its possible future into a ‘master code’ of linear progress towards Western civilization. In 
this account, the subaltern’s history appears insignificant and its only positive temporal 
reference point is in the future, often in the ideal of the ‘Western model’ of liberal-capitalist 
order. The postcolonial subject is labeled underdeveloped, told to aspire to and work towards 
this ideal, unlikely to ever reach it. It is placed in a position of eternal backwardness, 
separated from the West yet within the latter’s temporal parameters, keeping its own temporal 
outlook private. 
 
Thus far, the postcolonial subject appears as a silenced and disenfranchised being, with no 
independent agency. It “cannot speak” (Spivak 1988) or, rather, is not heard in the colonial 
configuration (Rao 2013). Yet it is this condition, which kindles emancipation and demands 
for justice as basic motivations and shapes their behavioral expression. Making this visible is 
the focus of the second face of postcolonial theorizing, infused with an attitude of defiance 
and the normative aim to support the subaltern’s empowerment. It constitutes the postcolonial 
subject as an emerging political actor that can take various forms, such as a state from the 
Global South, a domestic protest movement, or a transnational network of activists. Crucially, 
these actors are shown not only as wanting to challenge and emancipate from the colonial 
configuration but also as capable of doing so: they resist, subvert and, to a degree, escape and 
transform the colonial configuration by reclaiming ‘their’ territorial space and gaining control 
of ‘their’ being in time, their biographical narrative. This capability emerges by channeling 
the experience of the colonial configuration against it and is expressed in diverse practices of 
“decolonialisation” (Jabri 2013).  
 
Two broad conceptions of postcolonial agency flow from the colonial configurations outlined 
above. The first highlights the anti-colonial outlook of the subject, which defines itself and 
acts against the colonial power and the condition it finds itself in. It is an antagonistic and 
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confrontational account in which the subject seeks to recover its authentic being by 
reclaiming its native territory and recovering its silenced history, but also is lead by the vision 
of “the veritable creation of a new man” (Fanon 1963: 28). This involves abolishing the 
spatial and temporal zone inhabited by the colonial power and, with it, the destruction of the 
colonial world (Ibid. 31). Because in this account the colonial configuration is based on 
violence, both physical and epistemic, challenging it requires radical violent acts in return and 
places the postcolonial actor in “a murderous and decisive struggle” (Ibid. 48). In the course 
of this struggle the postcolonial subject not only becomes a violent actor but also regains self-
consciousness and, ultimately, reinvents itself as a decolonised subject. Although, as Fanon 
(1963: 201) concedes, the struggle leaves psychological marks, making a complete disconnect 
from the colonial experience impossible. In the second conception, the postcolonial subject 
does not see the possibility of an epistemologically pure and separate being in either space or 
time. While a moment of temporary separation from the colonial configuration can be 
achieved through ‘strategic essentialism’ (Spivak), emancipation is sought through rather than 
radically against this configuration. It is done by using the “double-consciousness” (Du Bois) 
and hybrid status acquired through inhabiting and experiencing ‘both worlds’ in its favour, 
using “mimicry” (Bhabha 1994) and the learned ability to navigate liminal spaces and 
multiple pasts and futures in creative ways. In this reading, the postcolonial subject exercises 
agency not by violent confrontation but by shifting meaning in a way that subverts and 
destabilizes the authority of the colonizer and its normative base. More than an act of 
resistance, it makes and takes control of its place in postcolonial space-time with the 
“potential to reconstitute the international” (Jabri 2104: 375).  
 
Conclusion 
Almost three decades ago, Yosef Lapid (1989: 236) celebrated the post-positivist moment as 
the “re-awakening of metatheoretical impulses” among IR scholars. Today it appears that one 
of the victims of the Third Debate has been grand theory, as modern and post-modern 
positions – the two sides of the ‘debate’ – have encouraged the shallow use of theory and the 
rejection of theory, respectively. ‘Thinking big’ in the sense of substantial theorizing 
combining interpretive, explanatory and normative elements seems to have been pushed to the 
margins. In an attempt to counter this tendency and advance a discussion over what makes a 
substantive theory of world politics, this article implicitly followed Lapid’s suggestion that 
one way to channel reflexivity is “systematic reconstruction” with the aim “to order and 
transcend diversity without submitting a new orthodoxy” (Ibid). It tried to reconstruct the 
macro-foundations of grand theories by putting forward the notion of ‘deep theorizing’ as, 
basically, a philosophical grounding of agency in the conceptualization of the ontology of 
political actors (subjects) and their drives (basic motivations) through an account of the 
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human condition. Specifically, the article argued that arguments about (inter)actions and 
orders in world politics are derived from particular readings of drives/basic motivations and 
the constitution of the subject/actor, which are developed and entwined with a particular 
understanding of how ‘the subject’ is situated in social space and time.  
 
The plausibility of this approach was illustrated by revisiting realist, liberal and postcolonial 
schools of thought. Placing postcolonialism alongside realism and liberalism was to affirm its 
status as a substantial alternative that fills an embarrassing blind spot in mainstream 
discussions about world politics.15 The intention was not and cannot be to evaluate which of 
the three schools is deeper, but to point to comparable meta-theoretical foundations. While 
this article could offer only a crude sketch of each, it conveyed a dynamic process of 
theorizing that generates multiple, and multifaceted, subject ontologies and a variety of drives 
and behavioral expressions thereof. Within these, each school presents distinct forms of 
political agency attempting to order and own its situatedness in space and time informed by 
distinct attitudes – pessimism, optimism, and defiance. Each school theorizes in a logically 
coherent and creative way, yet their dynamic nature also produces tensions, serving as a 
reminder that grand theories are not only analytically rich but also less reified than sometimes 
portrayed (Levine and Barder 2014).  
 
In carving out these features and highlighting the central function of a human condition 
account the article not only hopes to contribute to a discussion about what theoretical depth 
might be. It also offers an explanation for the relevance and persistent appeal of grand 
theories in IR, namely their ability to ground their ontologies, explanations and prescriptions 
in answers to philosophical questions of what drives ‘us’, where and who ‘we’ are, and should 
be, in space and time. Because the answers can only ever be particular, they also are political. 
Deep theorizing is not simply offering an analytical window on particular actors and 
(inter)actions; in taking and making a perspective and charting a path through the human 
condition it also is political theorizing. Of course, depth should not be confused with 
comprehensiveness and deep theorizing can produce a quite narrow account of world politics. 
Yet to the extent that an account of the human condition resonates with experiences and 
outlooks of some people across space and time, grand theories are expressions of “pluralistic 
universalism” (Acharya 2014: 649). And as long as we treat them not as innate truths but as 
sites for debate about where and how world politics takes (or ought to take) place, they 
remain indispensable for our field. In this vein, the approach put forward could be fruitfully 
applied to other schools and individual efforts to theorize world politics, and a more careful 
                     
15 Whether it is the ‘non-Western’ theory some are looking for is another question (Acharya 2011; 
Thakur 2015). 
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study might focus on how accounts of the human condition are shaped by the position and 
biography of particular authors. It could also be used to explore linkages between schools, to 
show where they build on or implicate each other, and where they present distinct 
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